

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Iran

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1. The following is a paraphrase of Prime Minister Mossadeq's explanation to his Council of Ministers regarding his conflict with the Shah:

a. "After Razmara was killed, [] the Shah made a number of representations [] for the purpose of obtaining [] the Anglo-Iranian Oil Agreement. [] efforts at this early stage, the British, with the aid of the Shah, would surely have had their way. Later, when the Council of Ministers [] decided to close all British consulates, Ambassador Sir Francis Shepherd called and demanded [] When he became aware of the fact [] no intention of submitting to his demand that the decree for closure be rescinded, he took his case to the Shah. Once more the Shah attempted to interfere in political matters to the detriment of his own country [] became irritated by such interference. As time went on, it became obvious [] the Shah was doing his best to undermine my Government. [] the Ministry of National Defense for purposes of controlling the Security Forces. As you know, the Shah refused [] At that time a bill was introduced in the Majlis to transfer the authority of Commander-in-Chief from the Shah to the Minister of Defense [] opposed this bill as you know, [] been against the Shah then, [] opposed such a bill? Of course not, [] then went to the Shah and asked him his preference for Chief of Staff. He requested that [] Mahmud Baharmast as Chief of Staff and also place Alavi (fnu) in a responsible post. Both were made members of the Security Council, and were loyal to the Shah.

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- b. With this background in mind we come to the more recent activities of the Court against the Government: the activities of certain military leaders, the Bakhtiari affair,² the Iraqi Frontier trouble, and the contemplated return to Iran of Princess Ashraf and the Queen Mother. To prevent further intrigue by the Court [] Majlis Deputies Zolfaghari and Mir-Ashrafi (no Government man), and Seyyed Ibrahim Milani³ to protest these activities. [] to see the Shah, who denied all. [] seven more Deputies (whom you all know) to the Shah with the message that either he cooperate [] 100 percent or be faced [] resignation. The reply was, "Don't resign, I'll leave the country."
- c. Thus the stage was set. [] believing that the Shah actually was going to leave, arranged for his foreign exchange needs, passports, etc. Then, on Friday evening (27 February 1953) [] Mullah Behbehani and Shams al Din Qanatabadi were planning a huge demonstration at the Palace for the next day. Saturday morning [] Baharmast to deploy Security Forces throughout the city so as to avoid any trouble when the Shah was leaving. [] to take every measure to insure order in the city. By 1100 hours there were no signs of the Shah's departure [] that the Chief of Staff and Military Governor had not carried [] orders [] suspicious (particularly when Behbehani and others called and asked [] prevent the Shah's departure) and went to see the Shah.³ By that time crowds were gathering around the Palace shouting pro-Shah slogans [] You all know what happened after that. Thus, you see that this was a well-executed plan by the opposition to attempt to build a basis of popular strength on which to challenge [] This is the kind of Shah [] But no more. He and his friends are finished [] Government is in control of the situation.

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4. According to a 6 April 1953 United Press dispatch, Mossadeq in a nationwide broadcast accused the Shah of plotting to kill him and demanded that the Shah give up his ruling powers.

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